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THE MARKET-ORIENTED ENTERPRISE APPROACH:
THE BEST RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONABLE
UNITED STATES TRADE PRACTICES SCRUTINIZED
IN GPXINTERNATIONAL TIRE CORP. V UNITED
STA TES
Lauren W. Clarke+

[T]here is essentially only one argument for free or freer trade, but it
is an exceedingly powerful one, namely: Free trade promotes a
mutually profitable regional division of labor, greatly enhances the
potential real national product of all nations, and makes possible
higher standards of living all over the globe.1
Liberal trade policy characterizes the modem trend in international trade.2
For decades, nations have recognized the importance and benefits of free trade,
which creates marketplace efficiencies and promotes global welfare.3 With the
reduction of tariffs and elimination of quantitative restrictions, countervailing
and antidumping laws serve as the legal mechanisms to counteract
imperfections caused by economic globalization and liberal trade policy.4
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.S., 2009, Cornell University. The author would like to thank Professor Rett Ludwikowski for
his invaluable insight and guidance throughout the writing process. The author would also like to
express her deepest gratitude to her mother, brothers, aunts, uncles, cousins, grandmother, and
friends for their unparalleled love, support, and encouragement. Finally, the author dedicates this
Note to her grandfather and role model, Henry Passerini.

1. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 692 (9th ed. 1973).
2.

See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL.,

LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC

RELATIONS 45 (5th ed. 2008) (outlining the growth and importance of international trade
liberalization). But see THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 9-10 (Daniel

Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009) (explaining how a protectionist approach toward trade remained the
norm into the late eighteenth century, but also noting that trade liberalization eventually did
spread to Europe).
3.

JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 21-23 (demonstrating how a reduction in tariffs

eliminates trade barriers and creates efficiencies in the global market). The 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established to reduce the prevalence of trade
protectionism in the post-World War It era. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 194-96; THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 2, at 14-15. GATT eventually led to the creation of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING

THE WTO 9-10 (5th ed. 2010). The WTO was designed to further the liberal trade objectives of
GATT by providing a forum for negotiating, monitoring trade policies, and administering
multilateral trade agreements. Id.
4.

JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 691, 752.

In particular, countervailing and

antidumping laws combat "unfair" trade practices. Id. ("[E]xtensive counter-measures are
permitted to respond to imports that are 'dumped,' subsidized, or otherwise considered to be in
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More specifically, these trade remedies provide "relief from unfair trade
practices that hinder [the] competitiveness [of domestic industries and
workers] in the U.S. market and abroad."
Countervailing duties (CVDs) are applied when domestic industries have
been harmed by the exporting country's government or a public entity has
harmed domestic industries.7 Meanwhile, antidumping duties (ADs) respond
to goods imported from a foreign market and priced at "less than [their] fair
value."8 To levy either trade remedy, there must be proof that the domestic
industry has suffered injury caused by the exporting country's unfair trade
violation of international rules of conduct."); see also THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 2, at 22 (defining economic globalization as a "simple
extension of economic activities across national boundaries" (quoting PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL
SHIFT: TRANSFORMING THE WORLD ECONOMY 5 (3d ed. 1998))); Michael Sandier, Primer on
United States Trade Remedies, 19 INT'L L. 761, 762-63, 769, 782 (1985) (providing a detailed

explanation of trade remedies that respond to fair or unfair trade practices).
5. Press Release, Dep't of Commerce, Obama Admin. Strengthens Enforcement of U.S.
Trade Laws in Support of President's Nat'l Exp. Initiative (Aug. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2010/08/26/obama-administration-strengthensenforcement-us-trade-laws-support-pr [hereinafter Dep't of Commerce Press Release]; see also
An

Introduction to

US.

Trade Remedies, INT'L TRADE ADMIN.,

http://ia.ita.doc.gov/

intro/index.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2011) (presenting an overview of countervailing and
antidumping duties, and explaining how these remedies seek to protect domestic industries from
unfair competition by correcting the harm imposed by unfair pricing and government subsidies).
6.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1565 (9th ed. 2004) (defining "subsidy" as a "specific

financial contribution by a foreign government or public entity conferring a benefit on exporters
to the United States").
7. See Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 367-71, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 1671(a) (2006)). To invoke a CVD, federal law stipulates that there be a finding that (1)
the specified imports have been subsidized; and (2) the domestic industry is "materially injured,
or is threatened with material injury, or . .. is materially retarded." Id. See generally Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154,
(defining the WTO rules and procedures governing CVDs that are binding on all member States).
A countervailable subsidy applies when a government or public entity confers a benefit,
through direct financial contributions or indirect support through a payment to a funding
mechanism, to a domestic manufacurer, producer, or other party. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5); see also
Scott D. McBride, Something Wicked this Way Comes: The United States Government's
Response to Unsafe Imported Chinese Toys and Subsidized Chinese Exports, 45 TEX. INT'L L.J.

233, 276 (2009) ("[C]ountervailing duty laws allow the respective governments to impose duties
on certain imported merchandise that has been shown to be subsidized in the country of
production to the detriment of domestic producers."). The amount of the CVD shall equal the
calculated amount of subsidization provided by the foreign country. VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 33550, TRADE REMEDY LEGISLATION: APPLYING COUNTERVAILING
ACTION TO NONMARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES 2 (2008).

8. 19 U.S.C. § 1673; see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 756 (explaining that
dumping occurs when goods are exported (1) at prices below the prices charged in the origin
market, or (2) at prices that are insufficient to cover the cost of production); Aaron Ansel, Market
Orientalism: Reassessing an Outdated Anti-Dumping Policy Towards the People's Republic of

China, 35 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 883, 885 (2010) ("Anti-dumping laws operate by imposing a
duty on foreign imports equal to the amount by which the import is considered undervalued, in
cases where domestic manufacturers of similar goods . . . are hurt by such undervaluation.").
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practices.9 The application of CVDs and ADs is relatively seamless when
imposed against other market economies.' 0 However, the application of these
trade remedies becomes considerably more problematic when imposed against
countries designated as nonmarket economies (NMEs)."
When levied against NME countries, the application of trade remedies
creates several complications because products in those countries do not
"reflect the fair value of the merchandise."' 2 For this reason, many U.S. laws
give parties more leeway in applying ADs and CVDs against NME countries.' 3
Prior case law reflects the irresolute nature of the United States' application of
trade remedies against NME countries. 14 However, problems arise when the
9. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (describing countervailing duties); 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2)
(describing antidumping duties). The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) is
responsible for the injury determination. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1673(2), 1677(2).
10. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-608T, U.S.-CHINA TRADE:
CHALLENGES AND CHOICES TO APPLY COUNTERVAILING DUTIES TO CHINA 17 (2006)
(statement of Loren Yager, Director of International Affairs and Trade). In the context of ADs,
the Department of Commerce (Commerce) simply calculates the dumping margin by finding the
difference between the company's export price and the normal value of the product in its home
market. See Patricia H. Piskorski, A Dangerous Discretionary "Duty": U.S. Antidumping Policy
Toward China, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 603-04 (2005). In the context of CVDs, however,
Commerce can assess the amount of the government subsidy with specificity because the
economy operates according to market principles. See Sanghan Wang, U.S. Trade Laws
ConcerningNonmarket Economies Revisited for Fairness and Consistency, 10 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 593, 602 (1996) (explaining how subsidies can be measured in market economies by
"parsing out the govemmentprovided [sic] benefits from the independent financial condition of
the enterprise").
11. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (defining a "nonmarket-economy country" as a foreign
country that "does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of
merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise"); U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 10, at 17-19; Piskorski, supra note 10, at 603-05; Wang,
supra note 10, at 598-608.
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A); see also YAN LUO, ANTI-DUMPING IN THE WTO, THE EU,
AND CHINA 162 (2010) (defining an "NME" as a national economy, which is greatly influenced
by central planning of the government, rather than normal market forces).
In fact, NMEs did not exist when Congress drafted the original countervailing and
antidumping statutes. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
1986). Congress added subsequent provisions and amendments to the statutory text to respond to
the changing and dynamic global marketplace. See generally TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 33976, UNITED STATES' TRADE REMEDY LAWS AND NON-MARKET
ECONOMIES: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 1-15 (2007) (explaining the evolution of legislation to
accommodate for NME countries in international trade).
13.

See PHILIP BENTLEY & AUBREY SILBERSTON, ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING

ACTION: LIMITS IMPOSED BY ECONOMIC AND LEGAL THEORY 8 (2007) (explaining how the law
affords greater leniency in the context of NMEs, as compared to the rules and procedures
designed for the application of trade remedies against other market economies).
14. See Christopher Blake McDaniel, Sailing the Seas of Protectionism: The Simultaneous
Application of Antidumping and CountervailingDuties to Nonmarket Economies-An Affront to
Domestic and InternationalLaws, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 741, 759-62 (2010) (presenting
the various approaches in U.S. trade remedy law against NMEs since 1986); see also discussion
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law and jurisprudence attempt to accommodate the current dynamic structure
of the global economy. s Exporters in NME countries-such as China-16
question the fairness of the current, contradictory practice of applying ADs
according to NME status,' 7 while applying CVDs according to
market-economy status. 8 Many Chinese enterprises criticize U.S. trade law as
unfair because it "fail[s] to keep pace with the market reforms of the Chinese
economy."' 9
For nearly twenty years, the United States applied ADs as the sole remedy
against unfair trade practices posed by NME countries.20 During that time, the
Department of Commerce (Commerce) categorically refused to review any
countervailing petitions against NME countries.21 Congress periodically
amended the antidumping statutes to levy duties against NME countries more
effectively and accurately. 22 And, recently, Commerce has accepted that some
NME countries-such as China-have substantially transitioned to no longer
infra Part I. Since 1986, ADs provided the sole remedy against unfair trade practices by NME
countries. Infra Part 1. However, in 2007, Commerce concluded that both ADs and CVDs could
be applied against certain NME countries that had significantly reformed from the traditional
Soviet-style communist economies. Infra Part I.C.
15. See Joel R. Paul, The New Movements in InternationalEconomic Law, 10 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 607, 608-09 (1995).
16. See Antidumping, Natural Menthol from the People's Republic of China: Final
Determination at Less than Fair Value, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,614 (May 1, 1981) (granting the original
classification of China as an NME); Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia et al., Office of Policy,
to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin. 1-3 (May 15, 2006) (on file with the
author) (articulating reasons that Commerce deems China to be an NME country).
17. See discussion infra Part I.B.
18. See GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States (GPX II), 715 F. Supp. 2d. 1337, 1343 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2010); GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States (GPXI), 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1237 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2009). China has challenged the legality of U.S. trade-remedy practice before the
WTO. See Request for Consultations by China, United States-Definitive Anti-dumping and
CountervailingDuties on Certain Productsfrom China, WT/DS379/1 (Sept. 19, 2008); Request
for Consultations by China, United States - PreliminaryAntidumping and CountervailingDuty
Determinationson CoatedFree Sheet Paperfrom China, WT/DS368/1 (Sept. 14, 2007).
19. Ansel, supra note 8, at 883 (citing BUREAU OF FAIR TRADE FOR IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
OF THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, RESPONSE TO THE
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT'S SECOND REQUEST FOR COMMENTS CONCERNING MARKET
ECONOMY TREATMENT FOR INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS IN ANTIDUMPING PROCEEDINGS

INVOLVING

CHINA

7 (Dec.

10,

2007),

available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/nme-

moe/comments-2007121 I0/boft-nme-moe-cmt-2007121 0.pdf)).
20. See discussion infra Part L.B.
21.

TATELMAN, supra note 12, at 9.

22. See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (2006) (stipulating that in instances when
the normal value cannot be accurately determined, the normal value shall be derived from the
costs in a surrogate country with a comparable level of development); see also BENTLEY &
SILBERSTON, supra note 13, at 12, 66-67 (explaining how "an 'analogue' or 'surrogate' normal
value" can be used to calculate dumping margins for NMEs); JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at

783 (explaining the difficulty of applying traditional antidumping rules to NMEs because the
prices in the home market are artificial); McBride, supra note 7, at 278 (describing the special
methodology for measuring dumping margins in NMEs).
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resemble traditional, Communist-controlled markets. 23 Thus, Commerce has
recognized the need to adjust its current approach regarding the application of
trade remedies against certain NME countries.24
In GPX InternationalTire Corp. v. United States (GPX 1), Chinese exporters

argued that the United States was "double counting" duties when it imposed
(1) ADs according to methodologies for NMEs; and (2) CVDs according to
market-economy status.25 The Court of International Trade (CIT), agreeing
that there was a "high potential" for double counting, 26 remanded the case,
instructing Commerce to develop a methodology that avoided the double
punishment.27
On remand, in GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States (GPX II), the

CIT concluded that Commerce had failed to develop a sound methodology that
would avoid double punishment when applying concurrent remedies against
NME countries. 28 The GPX II holding demonstrates how the CIT has
restricted the revolutionary policy reversal made by Commerce in 2007.29 The
decision brings to the forefront the need for a trade-remedy regime that has the
capability of protecting the interests of domestic industries, while ensuring fair
and prosperous trade relations with foreign exporters. 3 0
Recognizing the importance of healthy trade relations, especially during
times of an escalating trade deficit,31 makes it difficult to ignore the problems
that have surfaced regarding the U.S. trade-remedy regime toward NME
23.

See Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia & Lawrence Norton, Office of Policy, Imp.

Admin., to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin. 4 (Mar. 29, 2007) [hereinafter
Georgetown Steel Memorandum] (on file with the author); see also infra notes 93-97 and
accompanying text.
24. See Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 23, at 10-11 (allowing for the
application of both ADs and CVDs against China and similar NME countries).
25. GPX I, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1240-41 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009) ("GPX argue[d] that
double counting occurs when Commerce imposes a CVD remedy to offset an alleged government
subsidy, but then compares a subsidy-free constructed normal value (essentially using
information from surrogate countries) with the original subsidized export price to calculate the
AD margin."); see also James P. Durling, Encountering Rocky Shoals: Application of the CVD

Law to China, Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal Education, International
Trade Update, 2010 WL 956090, at *11 (Feb. 25, 2010).
26. GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
27.
28.
29.

Seeidat1251.
GPXII, 715 F. Supp. 2d. 1337, 1341-42 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010).
See Julie Zeveloff, GPX Ruling Could Shake up Duty Calculation Methods, LAW 360

(Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.law360.com/articles/125932 ("The [GPX] ruling represents a
relatively rare instance in which the [CIT] broke precedence by going against agency policy.").
30. See Dep't of Commerce Press Release, supra note 5 (discussing the need to strengthen
trade enforcement and describing proposed measures, which include addressing the concerns
addressed in GPXI and GPX If).
31. See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33563, CHINA-U.S. TRADE
ISSUES 1-3 (2010); see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, US-China Trade

Facts, CHINA, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china (last visited Apr. 16, 2011) (providing
detailed statistics regarding the trade relationships between the United States and China).
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countries.32 While trying to appease domestic industries,33 Commerce has
departed from its longstanding commitment against applying simultaneous
duties toward NME countries.3 4 In response, NME countries continue to
criticize the defective application of trade remedies by the United States.3 ' For
these reasons, the United States must devise a methodology that balances the
interests of domestic producers with exporters from NMEs.
This Note discusses the far-reaching impact of GPX I and GPX II on
international trade law. It first acknowledges the prevalence of global liberal
trade policies and recognizes the necessity of trade remedies in counteracting
the harm precipitated by economic globalization. This Note then examines the
settled case law governing the application of ADs and CVDs against NME
countries. Next, it discusses the recent trend in updating and reforming
applicable trade policies to accommodate transitioning NMEs, like China. In
light of this current development, this Note explores the subsequent case before
the CIT, GPX International Tire Corporation v. United States, analyzes the

implications of the holding, and presents possible solutions to manage this new
development. Finally, this Note proposes that market-oriented enterprise
(MOE) treatment provides the superior solution in advancing the preferences
of domestic industries and foreign exporters, while also maintaining the
integrity of the governing law.
I. TRADE-REMEDY LAW ATTEMPTS TO ACCOMMODATE CONDITIONS OF AN
EVOLVING GLOBAL MARKET

A. The Steel Cases of the 1980s
1. Commerce Concluded that Subsidies Cannot Be Found in NMEs

In November 1983, several U.S. steel manufacturers filed CVD petitions
36
In Carbon Steel Wire
with the International Trade Administration (ITA).
32.

See THOMAS LUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41108, U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: POLICY

ISSUES 8-9 (2010) ("Economic ties bind the [United States and China], but there are numerous
related disputes that strain the relationship.").
33. See MORRISON, supra note 31, at i ("U.S. domestic firms and workers that compete with
low-cost imported Chinese products, see growing economic ties as damaging to U.S. economic
interests, largely because of 'unfair' Chinese trading practices."). Domestic industries, injured by
alleged unfair trade practices, regularly petition the U.S. government to take steps to "eliminate
unfair economic policies in order to help achieve a level trading field." Id.
34. See Zeveloff, supra note 29; cf RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R 40461,

THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN

AND PROTECTIONISM 2 (Aug. 26, 2009)

(explaining how during times of economic hardship, countries have a protectionist tendency to
seek improvement of their trade position at the expense of foreign markets).
35. See, e.g., GPX1, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1240 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009) (exemplifying such
a critique).
36. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia: Final Negative Countervailing Duty
Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370 (May 1, 1984) [hereinafter Carbon Steel Wire Rod from
Czechoslovakia]; Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland: Final Negative Countervailing Duty
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Rodfrom Czechoslovakia, petitioners alleged that certain Czechoslovakian and
Polish manufacturers, producers, and exporters of carbon steel wire rods were
"receiv[ing], directly or indirectly, benefits constituting [subsidies] within the
meaning of section 303 of the [Trade] Act [of 1930]."" The ITA concluded
that CVDs were inapplicable because subsidies could not be found in
economies that do not function under ordinary market principles.38
First, the ITA reasoned that subsidies do not exist in an NME:
[A] subsidy (or bounty or grant) is definitionally any action that
distorts or subverts the market process and results in a misallocation
of resources, encouraging inefficient production and lessening world
wealth.
In NME[s], resources are not allocated by a market. With varying
degrees of control, allocation is achieved by central planning.
Without a market, it is obviously meaningless to look for a
misallocation of resources caused by subsidies. There is no market
process to distort or subvert. Resources may appear to be
misallocated in an NME when compared to the standard of a market
economy, but the resource misallocation results from central
planning, not subsidies.39
The ITA concluded that both Czechoslovakia and Poland could be
characterized as NMEs because the government of each nation maintained
Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,347 (May 1, 1984) [hereinafter Carbon Steel Wire Rod from
Poland]. The ITA, a sector of the Department of Commerce, is designed to "strengthen[] the
competitiveness of U.S. industry, promote[] trade and investment, and ensure[] fair trade through
the rigorous enforcement of [U.S.] trade laws and agreements." About the International Trade
Administration, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., http://trade.gov/about.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2011). The

Import Administration, a distinct business unit within the ITA, "[e]nforces U.S. trade laws and
agreements to prevent unfairly traded imports and to safeguard the competitive strength of U.S.
businesses." Id.
37. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg. at 19,370-71; Carbon Steel
Wire Rod from Poland, 49 Fed. Reg. at 19,375. According to the statutory text, the United States
may investigate whether countervailing duties are appropriate
[w]henever any country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of
government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation shall pay or bestow,
directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or export
of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country, dependency,
colony, province, or other political subdivision of government ....
Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 361-71, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687, repealed by Uruguay Round
Agreements Act of 1994, § 261, 108 Stat. 4809, 4908.
38. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg. at 19,371. The court
concluded that both Czechoslovakia and Poland could be classified as NMEs because they
"operate[d] on principles of nonmarket cost or pricing structures so that sales ... [did] not reflect
the market value of the merchandise." Id. at 19,374; Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 49
Fed. Reg. at 19,378; see also Robert F. Hoyt, Implementation and Policy: Problems in the
Application of CountervailingDuty Laws to Nonmarket Economy Countries, 136 U. PA. L. REV.

1647, 1648 n.7 (1988) (listing countries designated as NMEs in the 1980s).
39. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg. at 19,371.
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centralized control over the market and extensively involved itself in price
planning.40
Second, the ITA considered the congressional intent regarding the
application of CVDs to NMEs.41 The original countervailing statutes did not
address treatment toward NMEs because no country had exhibited that market
form when Congress initially drafted the statutes. Although the language of
43
the countervailing statute remained largely unchanged throughout the years,
Congress specifically amended antidumping44 and safeguard laws to combat
harm caused by trade with NME countries.46 Considering the congressional
silence and lack of clear intent, the ITA inferred that Congress did not intend
for countervailing duties to be levied against imports from NMEs.
Finally, the ITA afforded a high degree of deference to administrative
decisions,48 recognizing that Commerce maintains "broad discretion" in
determining whether a subsidy exists under various circumstances. 49 From this
analysis, the ITA conclusively determined that such a subsidy could not exist
in an NME.so
40. Id. at 19,373; Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 49 Reg. at 19,377 ("[F]or
NME[']s ... prices are administered and ... do not have the same meaning as prices in a market

economy . . . economic activity is centrally directed through the use of administered prices, plans
and targets."). Because NMEs fail to exhibit traditional market forces, in an NME country,
[p]rices are set by central planners. "'Losses"' suffered by production and foreign trade
enterprises are routinely covered by government transfers. Investment decisions are
controlled by the state. Money and credit are allocated by the central planners. The
government sets the wage bill. Access to foreign currency is restricted. Private
ownership is limited to consumer goods.
Id at 19,376; see also Cont'l Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 549 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985) ("[T]he existence of [NMEs] was found to be evidenced by central government control of
prices, central government control of the allocation of resources and . . . extremely limited
convertibility of the national currency."), vacated, rev'd in part sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp.
v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
41. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg. at 19,373.
42.

See Georgetown Steel Corp., 801 F.2d at 1314.

43. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg. at 19,373.
44. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §321(c), 88 Stat. 1978, 2047 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §1677b(c) (2006)) (deriving dumping calculations from surrogate
market-economy countries because valuations from state-controlled-economy countries were
unreliable).
45. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2436, 2437 (providing special provisions for application against NME
countries).
46. See, e.g., Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg. at 19,373.
47. Id. at 19,374 (finding that "Congress [had] reaffirmed its determination to regulate
unfair competition from NME countries" by deliberately amending the antidumping statute and
preserving the countervailing statute.).
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209, 1316 (C.C.P.A. 1977),
affid, 437 U.S. 443 (1978)).
50.

Id
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2. The CIT Held that Commerce Misappliedthe Law in the Steel Cases

After the ITA issued its decision, petitioners quickly challenged the holding
before the CIT. 1 In ContinentalSteel, the CIT reversed the ITA's conclusion
in Carbon Steel Wire Rodfrom Czechoslovakia.5 2

First, the CIT inferred that Congress intended for the countervailing-dut
law to cover "any country," regardless of the form of the nation's economy.
The court reasoned that the comprehensiveness and "meticulous inclusiveness"
of the statutory language demonstrated Congress's intent "to cover all possible
variations of the acts sought to be counterbalanced [by CVD's]." 54 Therefore,
the court concluded that Congress did not intend for countervailing actions to
include a jurisdictional bar based on a country's economic system.
Second, the CIT found that the ITA based its decision on fallacies and
illogical reasoning. The court disagreed with the ITA's underlying premise
that subsidies can exist only in market economies. 57 In fact, the court stated
that the essence of subsidization is "the encouragement of exportation by
means of some type of special preference."5 8 Although such preferential
treatment may be difficult to identify and measure in an NME, the court
found that these difficulties should not excuse the imposition of CVDs. 60
Based on its review of the legislative history and statutory language, the CIT
concluded "that variation in the extent of control exercised by the foreign
government over the economy was not a factor impeding the enforcement of

51. See Cont'1 Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 549 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985)
vacated, rev'd in part sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); see also Richard N. Eid, The Effect of Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States on
Nonmarket Economy Imports, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 65, 70-71 (1988).

The CIT has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals concerning countervailing- and
antidumping-duty cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (2006). CIT rulings are appealable to the Federal
Circuit, and then to the Supreme Court of the United States. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at

120.
52. See Cont'I Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 550, 557 ("The position taken by Commerce is at odds
with the plain meaning and purpose of the law. It contradicts judicial interpretation of the law. It
is inconsistent with past administration of the law. It also appears to be self-contradictory from
its inception.").
53. Id. at 550.
54. Id. at 551.
55. See id at 551-52.
56. Id. at 550.
57.

Id. at 552.

58. Id. at 553.
59. See Wang, supra note 10, at 602 ("[I]t may be practically impossible to determine the
level of specific subsidies in a nonmarket economy."); see generally Carbon Steel Wire Rod from
Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370, 19,372 (May 1, 1984) (pronouncing Congress's difficulty
"disaggregat[ing] government actions in such a way as to identify the exceptional action that is a
subsidy" in the context ofNMEs).
60. Cont'1 Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 554.
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the [countervailing] law." 61 Thus, the CIT directed Commerce to reinitiate
countervailing investigations on the parties to the case.62
3. The FederalCircuitReinstated the ITA's Ruling, Holding that
CountervailingLaw Does Not Apply to NMEs

The Unites States appealed the CIT's ruling in Continental Steel, and the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit heard the consolidated case in
Georgetown Steel v. United States.63 The Federal Circuit vacated the CIT's
decision and reinstated the ITA's conclusions in Carbon Steel Wire Rodfrom
Czechoslovakia. Considering the legislative history and the development of
applicable trade law, the Federal Circuit concluded that Congress intended for
antidumping law-not countervailing law-to remedy unfair trade practices by
NMEs.
In reaching its decision, the Federal Circuit first considered whether
economic incentives and benefits granted by the government of the NME
country constituted a "subsidy" under the U.S. countervailing statute.66 In
determining whether CVDs could apply to NMEs, the court found that it could
not rely on the statute's plain language because NMEs did not exist when
Congress originally drafted the statute in 1897. 67 The court believed that the
evidence that Congress had amended the countervailing statute six times, yet
failed to address the issue of treatment toward NMEs, "strongly suggest[ed]
that Congress did not intend to change the scope or meaning of the
provision."68
Furthermore, through the Trade Act of 1974, Congress
deliberately amended the Antidumping Act of 1921 to address exports from
NMEs through the "surrogate country" methodology.69 Ultimately, the court
reasoned that "changes in the antidumping law [that] were necessary to make
that law more effective in dealing with exports from [NMEs], coupled with
[congressional] silence about application of the countervailing duty law to such
exports, strongly indicate[d] that Congress did not believe that the latter law
covered nonmarket economies." 0 Thus, the court found that the legislative
61. Id. at 556-57.
62. Id. at 557. In its conclusion, the court noted, "[t]o allow [Commerce] to develop such an
extraordinary exception to the law would go beyond deference to an administrative agency." Id
63. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1308-10 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(examining the propriety of imposing CVDs on potassium chloride (potash) products imported
from the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union).
64. Id at 1317-18.
65. Id
66.

Id at

1313.

67. Id at 1314.
68. Id
69. Id at 1316; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982) (outlining the methodology in which
the antidumping duties in NME countries are determined by the "value of such or similar
merchandise in a non-State-controlled-economy country").
70.

Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1317.
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history clearly demonstrated Congress's intention for antidumping law to serve
as the exclusive remedy against imports from NMEs. 7 1
The court also recognized that the administrative agency has "broad
discretion in determining the existence of a 'bounty' or 'grant' under
[countervailing] law." 72 Therefore, the judiciary must afford substantial
deference to Commerce's conclusions. 73 Thus, after evaluating the statutory
language, the characteristics of NMEs, and the legislative history, the Federal
Circuit ultimately concluded that Congress did not intend for countervailing
law to address harm caused by imports from NMEs. 4
B. The Long-Standing Commitment to Georgetown Steel

Congress's subsequent actions demonstrate its agreement with the Federal
Circuit's ruling in Georgetown Steel.75 Although the House of Representatives
proposed a bill that would have "amend[ed] the Tariff Act of 1930 to state that
the countervailing duty law does apply to a nonmarket economy country to the
extent that the administering authority can reasonably identify, and determine
the amount of, a subsidy provided by that country," this language was not
adopted in the final Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
Moreover, five subsequent Congresses attempted to address the application of
CVDs against NMEs by permitting the countervailable subsidy to be measured
through a surrogate country methodology; however, committees later dropped
each proposed bill.7

71. Id. at 1318 ("Congress . . . has decided that the proper method for protecting the
American market against selling by nonmarket economies at unreasonably low prices is through
the antidumping law.").
72. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984)). Chevron is the landmark case establishing agency deference. Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 842-45 (citations omitted) ("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations . . . ."); see also
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 123 ("[W]here courts are dealing with broad grants of power to
[an administrative agency] . . . they are unlikely to second guess the Executive Branch."); 21A
AM. JUR. 2D Customs Duties and Import Regulations § 257 (West 2008) (describing agency
deference in countervailing and antidumping proceedings).
73. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.
74. Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1314.
75. See JONES, supra note 7, at 11 (explaining that the Georgetown Steel decision "triggered

[an] immediate reaction in Congress"). But see Wang, supra note 10, at 606-07 n.61 (noting that
some politicians sought to counter Georgetown Steel through congressional action, but these
attempts proved unsuccessful).
76. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 628 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1547, 1661. Because the Senate did not include a similar provision in its own version of the bill,
the language from the House of Representative's bill was excluded from the final Act. See
VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33550, TRADE REMEDY LEGISLATION:
APPLYING COUNTERVAILING ACTION TO NONMARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES 11 (2007).

77.

JONES, supra note 7, at 11.
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Similar to Congress's reaction, Commerce loyally adhered to the court's
holding in Georgetown Steel.7
Courts have recognized this consistency,
noting, "Commerce's past interpretation of the [countervailing] statutes had
only been along clear lines--either a country was an NME country and CVDs
were not imposed, or it was a[] [market-economy] country and CVDs could be
imposed."7 In fact, Commerce categorically refused to carry out any CVD
investigations against NMEs for nearly twenty years. This trend continued
through the early years of the twenty-first century.8 1 Between 2000 and late
2006, Commerce had initiated forty-six petitions for ADs and zero petitions for
CVDs against China. 82
One narrow exception arose in 1991, when Commerce reviewed a petition
for the imposition of CVDs in Oscillating and CeilingFansfrom the People's

Republic of China.83 The petitioner alleged that despite China's NME status,
Commerce could properly calculate CVDs because the specific fan industry
84
In considering whether a petitioner
was sufficiently market-oriented.
qualifies as a market-oriented industry (MOI),8 5 Commerce set forth the
following criteria:
[1] there must be virtually no government involvement in setting
prices or amounts to be produced.... [2] [t]he industry .. . should be
characterized by private or collective ownership . . . [and][3]

[m]arket-determined prices must be paid for all significant inputs ...
and for an all-but-insignificant proportion of all the inputs
accounting for the total value of the merchandise.86

78.

Id. at 8.

79.

See, e.g., GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1239 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009).

80.
81.

JONES, supra note 7, at 8; see TATELMAN, supra note 12, at 9-10.
Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Investigations InitiatedAfter January 01, 2000,

IMPORT ADMIN., http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/inv-initiations-2000-current.html (last updated Nov.
20, 2010) [hereinafter AD & CVD Investigations Since 2000].

82. Id
83. Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Oscillating and Ceiling Fans from
the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,018 (June 5, 1992). Certain fan producers filed a
petition on behalf of domestic producers of oscillating and ceiling fans, requesting that
Commerce invoke CVDs against certain Chinese exporters. Id
84. Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from
the People's Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. at 57,616-17. The petitioner argued that the fan
industry operates like a market economy because privately owned producers comprise the
majority of the fan sector, the government does not control input by central planning, and the
government does not influence pricing or production decisions. Id.
85. Under the market-oriented industry approach, Commerce (foregoing the
surrogate-country valuation) calculates duties according to the values in its home market. See
Ansel, supranote 8, at 898-99.
86. Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Oscillating and Ceiling Fans from
the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. at 24,018; see also U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-05-474, U.S.-CHINA TRADE: COMMERCE FACES PRACTICAL AND LEGAL
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Nevertheless, the ITA ultimately concluded that the fan industry did not
meet the third requirement due to the government's substantial involvement in
"supplying significant inputs" to the fan industry. 87 Therefore, Commerce
declined to apply countervailing duties against that specific industry.88
Commerce remained steadfast in its adherence to the Georgetown Steel
ruling. 89 Although the Oscillating and Ceiling Fans from the People's
Republic of China decision potentially indicated a wavering approach toward
trade remedies against NMEs, 90 Commerce adamantly refused to investigate
any CVD petitions until late 2006.91
C. Departurefrom Georgetown Steel: Accommodating for Trends in the
Modern Global Economy

By 2007, Commerce departed from its general policy prohibiting the
application of CVDs to NMEs.92 Commerce re-evaluated the Georgetown
Steel decision, considering whether the holding remained applicable to the
present Chinese economy. 93 Although Commerce determined that China

CHALLENGES INAPPLYING COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 14 (2005) (explaining Commerce's criteria

for calculating qualifications of market-oriented industries).
87. Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Oscillating and Ceiling Fans from
the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. at 24,018. Commerce has yet to find that an NME
sector meets this test. Ansel, supra note 8, at 899 (criticizing the insurmountable MOI test).
88. Ansel, supra note 8, at 899. Thus, because a substantial portion of the industry's inputs
were not market-determined, the industry failed to meet market-oriented status. Id. at 898-99.
89. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
90.
91.

See TATELMAN, supranote 12, at 10.
See JONES, supra note 76, at 2-3; TATELMAN, supra note 12, at 10. The Georgetown

Steel decision remained good law for twenty years. See Duane W. Layton et al., US. Court of
International Trade Orders U.S. Government to Cancel CountervailingDuties on Chinese offthe-Road Tires, MAYER BROWN, (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.mayer

brown.com/publications/article.asp?id=9442&nid=6.
92. McBride, supra note 7, at 276, 279-85.
93. See generally Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 23. The jurisprudence in
Georgetown Steel was "framed according to the traditional, Soviet-style economies of the 1980s."
Id. at 2; see also McBride, supra note 7, at 282-85 (analyzing Commerce's findings in the
Georgetown Steel Memorandum).
In determining whether a foreign country has an NME, the following factors are considered:
(i) the extent to which the currency of the foreign country is convertible into the
currency of other countries;
(ii) the extent to which the wage rates in the foreign country are determined by free
bargaining between labor and management;
(iii) the extent to which joint ventures or other investments by firms of other foreign
countries are permitted in the foreign country;
(iv) the extent of government ownership or control of the means of production,
(v) the extent of government control over the allocation of resources and over the
price and output decisions of enterprises, and;
(vi) such other factors as the administering authority considers appropriate.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B) (2006).
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should remain an NME for the purposes of antidumping law,9 4 it concluded
that the substantial economic reforms of the Chinese economy made it possible
to identify and measure benefits and incentives, such as subsidies, for the
purposes of countervailing law. 95
Commerce reasoned that China should remain designated as an NME under
antidumping law because of the government's extensive involvement in the
economy.96 The agency found that the Chinese government continued to
maintain control over the economy as demonstrated through extensive stateowned enterprises, restriction of the movement of workers through limited free
bargaining, and insulation of Chinese national currency from market forces. 97
Nevertheless, Commerce concluded that China's present-day economy
embodied a significant departure from the Soviet-style economies exemplified
in Georgetown Steel.98 The agency noted that the Chinese government had
eliminated price controls on nearly all Chinese products, 99 allowed for the
development of an extensive private-industrial sector in areas not reserved for
the state's operation, 00 and permitted employers and employees to renegotiate
wages.' 0 In essence, the Chinese government substantially reduced its control
over many areas of its economy.102 Because the present-day Chinese economy
exhibits more market-oriented features than the economies illustrated in
Georgetown Steel, Commerce could determine subsidies under countervailing
law.

94. See Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 23, at 2-4 (noting that the Chinese
Government has "preserved a significant role for the state in the economy").
95.

See id at 4-11; Raj Bhala, Virtues, the Chinese Yuan, and the American Trade Empire,

38 HONG KONG L.J. 183, 243-44 (2008) (explaining the economic justification for Commerce's
policy change); McBride, supra note 7, at 284-85.
96. Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 23, at 5-6.
97. Id. at 3.
98. See id at 5 (observing that although the Chinese market remained "riddled with
distortions attendant to the extensive intervention of the PRC government," it had become notably
more flexible).
99. Id. The Memorandum reports that "market forces now determine the prices of more
than 90 percent of products traded in China." Id. (quoting THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
COUNTRY COMMERCE: CHINA 73 (2006)).

100. Id. at 6-7 (explaining that many of the state-owned industries have been significantly
privatized).
101. Id at 5.
102. See id. at 7 (noting that the present-day Chinese economy "features both a certain degree
of private initiative as well as significant government intervention, combining market processes
with continued state guidance").
103. See id. at 10 ("[W]e [Commerce] believe that it is possible to determine whether the
PRC Government has bestowed a benefit upon a Chinese producer . . . and whether any such
benefit is specific.").
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As a result, Commerce definitively changed its course in 2007 when the
agency issued its first CVD investigation against an NME country.'
In
Coated Free Sheet Paperfrom the People's Republic of China, Commerce

investigated subsidies on Chinese imports of coated free sheet paper. 05 The
agency's actions in Coated Free Sheet Paper marked a drastic departure from
its long-standing commitment to the Federal Circuit's landmark decision in
demonstrated that it could measure subsidies
Georgetown Steel; o0Commerce
in China-an NME country. 107
1I. GPXv. UNITED STATES RESTRICTS COMMERCE'S POLICY SHIFT BY
REQUIRING IMPROVED METHODOLOGIES TO MEASURE DUTIES AGAINST
NMES
A. A Surge ofPetitionsfor CVDs andADs Against China

With Commerce's monumental policy shift in 2007, "the floodgates had
opened,,1o and Commerce was inundated with petitions seeking to invoke
CVDs against China.1 09 In response, the agency has initiated twenty-five CVD
investigations and thirty-seven AD investigations against China."10 These
104. See Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China: Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination, 2 Fed. Reg. 60,645 (Oct. 25, 2007); Coated Free Sheet Paper
from the People's Republic of China: Amended Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,484 (Apr. 9, 2007).
105. See Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Coated Free Sheet Paper
from the People's Republic of China, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,546,
68,549 (Nov. 27, 2006); McBride, supra note 7, at 281-82.
106. See Press Release, Dep't of Commerce, Commerce Applies Anti-Subsidy Law to
China (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://www.manufacturing.gov/news/033007 cvd.asp
("[Commerce's] decision alters a 23-year old bipartisan policy of not applying the countervailing
duty (CVD) law to [NME] countries . . . ."); see also Mark Drajem, Double Duties on Imported
Chinese Tires Rejected by US. Court, BLOOMBERG Bus. WEEK (Aug. 5, 2010, 6:34 PM),

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-08-05/double-duties-on-imported-chinese-tiresrejected-by-u-s-court.html ("[Commerce] had reversed course on more than two decades of
precedent and allowed both antidumping duties and countervailing duties against imports from
China.").
107.

JONES, supra note 7, at 16.

108. Durling, supra note 25, at *4.
109. See id. at *4 & n.19. The United States' policy reversal, coupled with the mounting
trade deficit, has spurred domestic producers to seek out trade remedies to protect their livelihood
from unfair competition and economic injury. See Chad P. Brown, The Global Resort to
Antidumping, Safeguards, and other Trade Remedies Amidst the Economic Crisis, in CTR. FOR
ECON. POL. RESEARCH, EFFECTIVE CRISIS RESPONSE AND OPENNESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE

TRADING SYSTEM (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds., 2009), available at http://siteresources.world
bank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1239120299171/5998577-1244842549684/62
05205-1247069686974/Effective CrisisResponse and Openness.pdf (describing the historical
correlation between economic downturns and increased application of import-restricting trade
remedies).
110.

AD & CVD Investigations Since 2000, supra note 81.

In every case, the CVD

investigation was initiated in tandem with an AD investigation. See id; see also U.S. GOv'T
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events marked the dramatic change in the U.S. approach to applying trade
remedies against China and other NMEs."' The decision in CoatedFree Sheet
Paper lifted the moratorium placed on CVDs against NME countries and
triggered a starkly different trend in trade-remedy law.11 2
B. U.S. Tire Producers Sought to Invoke ConcurrentDuties Against Chinese
Exporters of Off-the-Road Tires

Producers of off-the-road tires joined the flood of petitioners and requested
that Commerce impose simultaneous duties on certain imports from China." 3
On June 18, 2007, petitioners filed a complaint on behalf of certain U.S. tire
producers, seeking to invoke ADs and CVDs against Chinese exporters of offthe-road tires.114 The petitioners claimed that they had been materially injured
by Chinese imports of certain off-the-road tires "sold in the United States at
less than fair value," in violation of 19 U.S.C § 1673 (antidumping law)." 5
The petitioners further alleged that domestic producers were materially injured

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 10, at 6 ("Generally, when petitioners seek imposition of
CVDs, they also seek imposition of antidumping duties on the same product from the same
country."); McBride, supra note 7, at 285 & 285 n.337 ("For each countervailing duty
investigation, there was a parallel antidumping investigation . . .
S111.See Durling, supra note 25, at *2-3.
112.

Id. at *3-4.

113. See AD & CVD Investigations Since 2000, supra note 81. Producers and manufacturers
of circular-welded carbon-quality steel pipe, light-walled rectangular pipe and tube, and
laminated woven sacks all filed petitions asking Commerce to invoke ADs and CVDs against
Chinese exporters of their respective merchandise. Id.; see also Durling,supra note 25, at *3.
114. Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China:
Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,122 (Aug. 7, 2007); Initiation of
Antidumping Duty Investigation: Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's
Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,591, 43,592 (Aug. 6, 2007). The petitioners included Titan
Tire Corporation, and the United States Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, ALF-CIO-CLC. Initiation of
Antidumping Duty Investigation, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,592; Initiation of Countervailing Duty
Investigation, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,122. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc. and its subsidiary,
Bridgestone Firestone North America Tire, L.L.C. were later brought into the action as petitioners
because of their significant interest in the matter. See Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires
from the People's Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and
Final Negative Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,480, 40,481 n. 1 (July
15, 2008).
115. Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,592. To be entitled to
relief, petitioners must show either material injury or threat of material injury. 19 U.S.C §
1673(2)(A)(i) (2006). Countervailing and antidumping laws require only a finding of material
injury to invoke remedies against unfair-trade practices, whereas the safeguard law requires a
finding of serious injury-a heightened injury threshold. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A)
(defining "material injury" as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant),
with 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(6)(C) (defining "serious injury" as "a significant overall impairment in
the position of a domestic industry").
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by Chinese exports of certain off-the-road tires that received unlawful
government subsidies in violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (countervailing law).116
Commerce reviewed the petition and agreed to initiate both countervailing
*
Commerce
and antidumping investigations. 117- In carrying out its investigation,
selected Guizhou Tire Company (GTO), Hebei Starbright Tire Company, Ltd.
(Starbright), and Tianjin United Tire & Rubber International Company
(TUTRIC), as mandatory respondents to represent Chinese producers and
exporters of the targeted merchandise.
After conducting a thorough
investigation, the ITA announced that it would impose both ADs and CVDs on
Chinese imports of off-the-road tires. 1 9 Additionally, the International Trade
Commission found the imposition of import-restricting remedies proper
because the targeted Chinese imports had caused material injury to
the specified domestic tire industry. 20 This affirmative-duty determination
accompanied the influx of simultaneous import-restrictin remedies placed
against imports from China since CoatedFree Sheet Paper.
C. Attacking the Existence of a Chinese Exporters Challengedthe New U.S.
Trade Policy

With the surge of petitions requesting CVDs against NME countries,
Chinese exporters have both resisted and challenged the new U.S. trade
In particular, exporters from NMEs argued that the U.S.
policy.122
trade-remedy law is manifestly unjust and contradictory, creating a regime
116. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a); Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 72 Fed. Reg. at
44,122.
117. Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,124; Initiation of
Antidumping Duty Investigation, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,595; see also Ansel, supra note 8, at 885-87
(presenting a detailed overview of U.S. trade-remedy investigations).
118. See Certain New Pneumatic off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China:
Notice of Amended Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and
Antidumping Duty Order, 73 Fed. Reg. 51,624, 51,625 (Sept. 4, 2008); Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Determination of Critical Circumstances,
73 Fed. Reg. at 40,481 n.2.
119. See Notice of Amended Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less than Fair
Value and Antidumping Duty Order, 73 Fed. Reg. at 51,625 (imposing an AD on Starbright
(29.93%), TUTRIC (8.44%), and GTC (5.25%)); Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination and Final Negative Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 Fed. Reg. at
40,483 (imposing a CVD on Starbright (14%), TUTRIC (6.85%), and GTC (2.45%)).
120. Certain off-the-Road Tires from China; Determination, 73 Fed. Reg. 51,842 (Sept. 5,
2008). For both ADs and CVDs, the ITA is responsible for determining the existence of dumping
or countervailable subsidies, whereas the ITC is responsible for the injury determination. See 19
U.S.C. § 167 1(a) (imposing countervailing duties); id. § 1673 (imposing antidumping duties).
121. See McBride, supra note 7, at 285; AD & CVD Investigations Since 2000, supra note
81.
122. See McBride, supra note 7, at 286, 294 ("Given the implications of Commerce's change
in practice and determination that it is possible to calculate countervailing duty rates with respect
to Chinese subsidies, it should come as no surprise that some of its determinations are now in
litigation."); see also supra note 17.
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premised on the notion that China is market-oriented in the context of
countervailing law, but not market-oriented for the purposes of antidumping
law. 12 3 This was the basis of GPX's argument when it filed a complaint in the
CIT on September 9, 2008, challenging Commerce's affirmative determination
to apply concurrent ADs and CVDs against certain Chinese imports of
off-the-road tires.124 Upon examination of the court's reasoning in GPXI, it is
evident that the ruling marked a new stage in U.S. trade policy with regard to

NME countries.12 5
D. The CIT's Mixed Ruling: Allowing for the Application of CVDs Against
NME Countries, but Requiring Improved Methodologies in the Application of
Such Duties
1. CVDs Can Be Applied Against NME Countries

In GPX I, the CIT ruled that there was no statutory bar on the imposition of
CVDs against NME countries because it could not conclude "from the
statutory language alone that Commerce does not have the authority to impose
CVDs on products from an NME-designated country."l26 However, GPX
argued that Congress intended for antidumping law to be the sole remedy to
combat unfair-trade practices by NMEs.127 GPX explained that the legislative
history clearly demonstrated the inapplicability of countervailing law against
NME countries because Congress "continuously [left] the CVD statute intact
while actively amending the AD law as it applied to NME countries.",28
The court, however, reasoned that Commerce had broad discretion to
determine the application of its import-restricting trade remedies.129 And,
although Commerce previously indicated that it would not apply CVDs to
NME countries because it could not disaggregate countervailable subsidies in
the Soviet-style markets of the 1980s,130 the court held that Commerce still
maintained the ability to decide whether the subsidy exists and whether the
remedy is proper.

123. See Durling, supra note 25, at *7 (noting the incompatibility of Commerce's new
practice in "try[ing] to defend two opposing and arguably irreconcilable views at the same time").
124. GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1234-35 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009). GPX International Tire
Corporation is a domestic importer of pneumatic off-the-road tires. Layton et al., supra note 91.
125. See Durling, supra note 25, at *1-4.
126. GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1239-40; see also Durling,supra note 25, at *6 ("[T]he CVD
statute is ambiguous on the treatment of NME countries, and . . . the Department has the
discretion to apply CVD law to NME countries.").
127. See GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Magnola Metallurgy, Inc. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2007); Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
130. See supra text accompanying note 39.
131. See GPXI, 645F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
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2. Commerce Chargedwith Correctingthe High Potentialfor Double
Counting Duties

Although the CIT concluded that Commerce possesses the authority to apply
CVDs against NME countries, the court recognized the uncertainty regarding
"how Commerce is to account for the overlap between the statutes when
imposing both CVD and AD duties on goods from an NME country." 32The
court acknowledged that a "high potential" for double counting existed when
the U.S. imposes simultaneous duties. 33 In GPX I, the court stated,
"Commerce's interpretation of the NME AD statute in relation to the CVD
statute here and the resulting methodologies are unreasonable."l 34 For these
reasons, the court ordered Commerce to refrain from imposing simultaneous
duties until it could accurately determine the existence and extent of the double
counting.13 5
At its inception, Congress did not foresee the possibility of a "hybrid"
trade-remedy regime in which NME-methodology ADs would be imposed
simultaneously with market-economy CVDs.136 However, concurrent ADs and
CVDs were imposed in this instance.' 37 Thus, Commerce applied the ADs
based on the antidumping margin, which is calculated by subtracting the export
price from the normal value of the merchandise.138 In the context of NMEs,
where prices and values are significantly distorted,139 Commerce uses data
132. Id. at 1240.
133. Id. at 1240-43 ("[T]here is a substantial potential for double counting of domestic
subsidies if Commerce applies CVDs to China while continuing to use its current NME
methodology to determine [ADs]." (quoting U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-474, U.S.-CHINA TRADE: COMMERCE FACES PRACTICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES IN
APPLYING COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 33 (2005))).
134. Id. at 1240. Although courts generally adhere to broad agency deference, there remains
a reasonableness standard that must be respected. Id ("Chevron requires us to defer to the
agency's interpretation of its own statute as long as that interpretation is reasonable." (quoting
Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1994))); see also Ceramica
Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 636 F. Supp 961, 966 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) ("As long as
the agency's methodology and procedures are reasonable means of effectuating the statutory
purpose, and there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the agency's conclusions, the
court will not impose its own views as to the sufficiency of the agency's investigation or question
the agency's methodology."); JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 121 ("In antidumping and
countervailing duty cases, certain government actions are reviewed to determine if they were
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or unlawful; while others are reviewed to determine if
they were supported by substantial evidence .... ).
135. GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1234-35, 1238, 1243.
136. Id. at 1242.
137. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
138. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006). The export price is the price at which it is designated to be
sold in the United States (after adjustments). Id. § 1677(a). The normal value is the price of the
foreign product in its home market. Id. § 1677b(a)(1). For a presentation of the substantive rules
for dumping calculations, see JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 770-82.
139. Price distortions may be attributed to central planning and extensive government
involvement in the marketplace. See supra note 40 and text accompanying note 39.
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from a surrogate (market-economy) country to measure the normal value of the
particular product.140 Therefore, when Commerce subtracts the export price
from the normal value (derived from third-country data), the price differential
should "reflect the price advantages that the exporting company has obtained
from both export and domestic subsidies."' 4 1 Thus, a high potential for double
counting exists when CVDs are applied in addition to ADs, which, in theory,142
have already offset the domestic benefit through the surrogate-country
methodology.1 43
Both federal statutes and applicable World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreements set forth rules and rocedures to ensure the fair and accurate
measurement of trade remedies.14 One court has commented that the statutory
scheme is designed to "facilitate [Commerce's] determination of dumping
margins as accurately as possible." 4 5 More specifically, federal statutes and
WTO agreements include provisions that require the antidumping margin to
account for a concurrent CVD imposed on the targeted product.146 In the
context of countries designated as NMEs, Commerce and the WTO allow

140. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c); see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 783 (explaining
antidumping rules in the context of NME); Piskorski, supra note 10, at 603-09 (explaining
dumping calculations for exports from nonmarket economies). Commerce generally selects India
or Pakistan as a surrogate for measuring the fair-market value of Chinese exports. Lei Yu, Note,
Rule of Law or Rule of Protectionism: Anti-Dumping Practices Toward China and the WTO
Dispute Settlement System, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 293, 327 (2002); see also supra note 22

(discussing the use of surrogate countries to calculate the normal value of products).
141. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 10, at 18. The study further
articulates the issue by describing the methodology that is used among market-economy
countries:
In contrast, when a market[-]economy methodology is used, both the normal value and
the export price will, in principle, reflect the benefits that the producer has derived from
domestic subsidies. Therefore, comparing the normal value with the export price will
not result in an antidumping duty rate that captures the benefits provided by these
subsidies; these benefits will be captured only in a CVD investigation. Thus, domestic
subsidy benefits generally would not be double counted.
Id. at 18 n.27.
142. Although the NME antidumping methodology largely offsets the benefits derived from
domestic subsidies, the surrogate country methodology may not entirely offset the countervailable
subsidy in the NME country. See id at 18 n.28.
143. Id. at 17-19; see GPX II, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1344 n.5 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010) ("The
broad NME AD margin would cover measureable benefits from a subsidy, which a CVD margin
is intended to counteract."); McDaniel, supra note 14, at 762-65 (presenting the double-counting
issue in the context ofNME countries).
144. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
145. Allied-Signal Aerospace Co. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1185, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
146. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C) (2006) (requiring the calculation of the dumping margin
to account for any countervailable subsidy); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. VI,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, A-24, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 214 ("No product ... shall be subject to
both anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or
export subsidization.").
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certain industries or sectors to request market-oriented status.
Also,
Commerce places the duty on the foreign exporters to avoid parallel duties by
showing affirmative proof of double punishment.148 In this way, the governing
documents provide some measures to accommodate various market conditions
to generate an accurate remedy calculation.149 However, these measures do not
fully address the inherent nuances of the present-day global economy.'so
Considering the current economic and trade circumstances, the GPX I court
believed that a "high potential" of double counting remained.
First, the
statute did not provide clear guidance regarding the relationship between
countervailing and antidumping laws in the context of NMEs.
Second,
allowing for the exporter to prove the inaccuracy of the duty calculations did
not sufficiently cure the problem.15 3 In fact, it imposed an "impractical and
onerous burden,"'154 because "there is likely no way for any respondent to
accurately prove [actual double counting]."'5 5 Thus, the court reasoned,
If there is a substantial potential for double counting, and it is too
difficult for Commerce to determine whether, and to what degree
double counting is occurring, Commerce should refrain from
imposing CVDs on NME goods until it is prepared to address this
problem through improved methodologies or new statutory toolS.156
Additionally, the court disagreed with Commerce's explanation for refusing
to review GPX's request to be treated as a market-oriented enterprise
(MOE).157 The court held that "Commerce's failure to address GPX's request
147. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-231, U.S.-CHINA TRADE:
ELIMINATING NONMARKET ECONOMY METHODOLOGY WOULD LOWER ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
FOR SOME CHINESE COMPANIES 26-27 (2006); Protocol of Accession, Accession of the People's
Republic of China, WT/L/432 § 15(a)(i) (Nov. 23, 2001) (providing that, if the industry
demonstrates that it is sufficiently market-oriented, then the WTO must use the domestic prices in
measuring the AD); see also supra text accompanying note 86 (listing the criteria for the
designation as a market-oriented industry).
148. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677a n.15 (Supp. 2010); GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1242-43 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2009); McBride, supra note 7, at 293 (explaining that the exporter must demonstrate:
(1) the domestic subsidy lowered all the prices in the domestic market; and (2) the existence of
the double remedy).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
150. See, e.g., infra note 238 (describing characteristics of China's economy, including its
work force, labor, and resources).
151. See GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
152. Id. at 1239.
153. Id. at 1242.
154. Id.
155. Id at 1243; see 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677a n.15 (Supp. 2010).
156. GPX I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
157. Id. at 1243-44. In noting significant reforms to the Chinese economy, Commerce
recognized the need to modify its current antidumping policy toward NME countries. See
Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Certain Non-Market Economies:
Market-Oriented Enterprise, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,302, 29,303 (May 25, 2007) (requesting public
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for MOE status because it had no policies, procedures, or standards for
evaluating MOE status was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by
substantial evidence." 15 8
For these reasons, the CIT remanded the case and ordered Commerce to
cease its imposition of CVDs against Chinese imports of off-the-road tires until
the agency adopted additional methodologies that would avoid double counting
when parallel duties are imposed. 159 The court also instructed Commerce to
review GPX's application for treatment as an MOE. 160
E. In GPX II, the CIT Affirmed Its ConcernsAbout the High Probabilityof
Double Counting

After the CIT remanded GPX I, Commerce took steps, although under
protest, to comply with the court's instructions.161 Commerce continued to
apply CVDs against China, but offset the CVD against the antidumping
margin, calculated according to the NME methodology.1 62 Commerce also
agreed to evaluate Starbright's request for treatment as an MOE, 16 but it
concluded that Starbright did not present adequate evidence to merit such a
status. 164
On August 4, 2010, in GPX II, the CIT reviewed Commerce's compliance
with the remand instructions.1 65 The court's determinations ushered in a new
era in trade-remedy law for tariffs applied against NMEs.1 66 The decision has
raised legal issues, demonstrating the insufficiency and uncertainty of the
comments in developing the MOE criteria). The agency allowed for individual Chinese
respondents to request market-economy treatment for the purposes of antidumping law. Id.; see
Ansel, supra note 8, at 902-17 (presenting a detailed description of the proposed legality of the
MOE approach, characteristics of an MOE, and the administration of the MOE valuation).
158. GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1246.
159. Id. at 1234-35. In its decision, the court explained,
[i]f Commerce is to apply CVD remedies where it also utilizes NME AD methodology,
Commerce must adopt additional policies and procedures for its NME AD and CVD
methodologies to account for the imposition of the CVD law to products from an NME
country and avoid to the extent possible double counting of duties.
Id.

160. Id at 1246.
161. Dep't of Commerce, Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand at 2, GPX
Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States (GPX 1), 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009),
available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/remands/09-103.pdf [hereinafter Remand Results] (describing
Commerce's respectful disagreement with the Court's reasoning in GPXI).
162. See id. at 7-11; see also GPX II, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010)
("Commerce proposes guarding against double counting by merely offsetting CVD against NME
AD after it uses its regular methodologies to calculate the CVD and NME AD margins.").
163. See infra text accompanying note 176.
164. Remand Results, supra note 161, at 15-20.
165. See GPXII, 715F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
166. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text (describing why GPX II may lead to
substantial reform in trade policy).
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countervailing and antidumping statutes and the limitations of agency
deference. 167
1. Failureto Correct the "Double Counting" Problem

Although the court reaffirmed the propriety of imposing CVDs against NME
countries, the GPX II court found fault with Commerce's methodology of
offsetting the CVD against the AD calculation.168 The court found it redundant
and wasteful to conduct a comprehensive countervailing investigation because
,,169
the new offset value would "always equal the unaltered NME AD margin.
Although Commerce argued that the statute required it to levy CVDs if a
countervailable subsidy existed, 170 the court believed that Commerce's
interpretation was contrary to Georgetown Steel.171 Thus, the court held that
the "offset [did] not comply with the statute. 172 Finding Commerce's
"improved methodologies"
insufficient, the court ordered Commerce to
cease its imposition of CVDs on the parties to the action. 174
2. Commerce's Decision to Deny MOE Status to Starbright was Justified

Despite the lack of established rules and criteria to evaluate the existence of
an MOE, the GPXI court ordered Commerce to consider its applicability.176
Upon examining Starbright's request to be treated as an MOE, the GPX II
court agreed with Commerce's conclusion that Starbright did not warrant MOE
status.
Starbright claimed it should be treated as an MOE because of "(1) its
complete ownership by a U.S. company, GPX; (2) its focus upon external
markets; and (3) its belief that any distortions to its manufacturing costs would

167.

See infra note 182.

168. GPXII, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1345.
169. Id.
170. See Remand Results, supra note 161, at 8 (interpreting the language in the 1930 Tariff
Act as providing for a mandatory duty: "if a country is providing a countervailable subsidy . . . a
countervailing duty 'shall' be imposed"); see also Bennet Marsh, Commerce Issues
Redetermination On Tires CVD Case "Under Protest," INSIDE US-CHINA TRADE, Sept. 8, 2010,

at 1, 10 (presenting Commerce's contention about the mandatory nature of the CVD statute).
171. GPXII, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1345 (quoting GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1240 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2009)) (noting that Georgetown Steel "makes clear that Commerce need not apply CVD
law to the same goods that are subject to NME AD calculations").
172. Id. at 1342. The court noted that because 19 U.S.C. § 1677a provides specified
permissible offsets for the dumping margin, Commerce's actions are inconsistent with the statute.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)-(d) (2006) (listing specific adjustments to export prices); GPXII, 715
F. Supp. 2d at 1345.
173. GPXII, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
174. Id. at 1341-42.
175. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing Commerce's explanation for
refusing to review Starbright's request to be treated as an MOE).
176. GPXII, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
177. Id. at 1347-48.
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Commerce disagreed because
be addressed in the companion CVD case."
Starbright had provided insufficient evidence and a cursory analysis in its
separate rates application.1 79 The court ultimately found Commerce's
conclusion to be "reasonable and supported by substantial evidence."' 80
F. GPX II Brings the Need for Reform to the Forefrontof Trade Policy

Although this case is binding only on the actual parties to the dispute,' 8'
GPX II has the potential to incite a new chapter in trade-remedy jurisprudence,
agency regulation, and legislation.' 8 2 Trade policy had remained relatively
Nevertheless, Commerce has recognized
unchanged for twenty-three years.
the need to update trade policy to meet the modem demands of the present-day
economy.184 GPX II demonstrates the flaws inherent in the policy shift, and
other adjustments that must be made to ensure that the law effectively and
fairly accomplishes its objective.
III. THE FAR-REACHING IMPACT OF GPXII: HIGHLIGHTING THE NEED FOR AN
EFFECTIVE SOLUTION

A. GPX II Reaches Beyond the Tire Industry

To foster a strong a successful domestic economy, U.S. trade law must
promote healthy trade relations with China. 8 5 Economic ties with China
began to flourish in 1979, when the parties signed a bilateral trade agreement
178. Remand Results, supra note 161, at 12.
179. GPX II, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1347. Commerce concluded that Starbright's MOE status
was unwarranted because it (1) failed to provide concrete evidence demonstrating that it operated
independently from the government regarding its export activities; (2) it failed to provide
evidence supporting its premise that its exclusive orientation to external markets eliminates the
influence of nonmarket factors in its business decisions; and (3) it failed to provide a "factual or
legal basis to conclude that the presence of a companion CVD case and findings that a company
has received countervailable subsidies." Remand Results, supranote 161, at 16-20.
180. GPXII, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. Although MOE status was not proper in this case, the
court was "alerting Commerce to the possibility of using MOE treatment to guard against double
counting." Id. at 1348 n.9.
181. John J. Burke, US Court Tells Commerce Department It Cannot Impose Countervailing
Duties When It Uses The Non-Market Economy Methodology in a Companion Antidumping Case,

CHINA-U.S. TRADE LAW (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com/2010/08/
articles/cvd/us-court-tells-commerce-department-it-cannot-impose-countervailing-duties-when-ituses-the-nonmarket-econom.
182. Layton et al., supra note 91 (discussing the potential outcomes that could stem from the
CIT's decision in GPXII).
183. Id
184. See Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 23, at 3.
185. See KERRY DAMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40457, CHINA-U.S. RELAnONS:
CURRENT ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, at i (Nov. 20, 2009) ("The bilateral

relationship between the U.S. and [China] is vitally important, [to a] wide range of areas
including . .. economic policy, security, foreign relations, and human rights.").
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that restored diplomatic ties.186 As of June 2010, China has become the
second-largest trading partner of the United States,' 87 the third-largest export
market, 88 and the greatest supplier of imports.189 Nevertheless, the mounting
economic downturn has strained U.S. trade relations with China.'90 China's
"unfinished transition from a centrally planned economy,"'91 coupled with a
severe trade deficit,192 has magnified tensions and concerns regarding China's
viability as a trading partner.19
The GPXII decision bears the capacity for a far-reaching impact on current
GPX II
trade-remedy law' 94 in both the United States and abroad.
demonstrates the unsettled nature of trade-remedy law in the modem global
economy.195 "[llnherent contradiction[s]"l 96 riddle Commerce's recent rulings,
and Commerce and the CIT continue to disagree as to the meaning of the
governing legislation and case law.1 97 However, both agree that China has

186. MORRISON, supra note 31, at 1.
187. Aside from Canada, China is the United States' largest trading partner, with goods
totaling $366 billion in 2009. LUM, supra note 32, at 8.
188. United States' exports to China totaled $69.6 billion in 2009. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 31.
189. In 2009, the United States imported $296.4 billion worth of goods from China. Id.
190. MORRISON, supra note 31, at 1-3, 14.
191. 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S WTO COMPLIANCE, U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE 3 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
asset upload filel92 15258.pdf.
192. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 31 ("The U.S. goods trade
deficit with China was $226.8 billion in 2009 . . . account[ing] for 45.3% of the overall U.S.
goods trade deficit in 2009.").
193. MORRISON, supra note 31, at 14 (describing major issues with the Chinese economic
climate, such as China's reluctance to adopt a market-based currency, its ineffective commitment
to its obligations under its accession to the WTO, and its government's involvement in promoting
certain domestic industries); see also WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 32165, CHINA'S CURRENCY: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR U.S.
TRADE POLICY 23-26 (2008) (discussing the challenges of China's currency manipulations,
which give China a competitive trade advantage and harm U.S. jobs and businesses); Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Dep't Statement Regarding Decision to Delay the Int'l
Econ. and Exch. Rate Policies Rep. to Cong. (Oct. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg910/aspx [hereinafter Treasury Dep't
Statement] (presenting the need to correct China's significantly undervalued currency problem);
Howard Schneider, US. Ramps Up China Currency Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2010, at A18
(describing how the United States places pressure on China to let its currency freely float).
194. See Layton et al., supra note 91.
195. See GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States (GPX III), No. 08-00285, 2010 WL 3835022,
at *1 (Ct. Int'l Trade, Oct. 1, 2010) (admitting to the "unsettled state of the law" regarding GPX
If's procedural and substantive issues); Marsh, supra note 170, at 10.
196. Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin., to
David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec'y for Imp. Admin. (July 7, 2008).
197. See, e.g., Remand Results, supra note 161, at 2 (illustrating the conflicting
interpretations of law because the redetermination was made "under protest" from Commerce).
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taken substantial strides in reforming economic policies in its transition to a
free-market economy.198
B. Implications and Legality ofAlternative Approaches

According to GPX and the Chinese Government, the GPX I ruling gave
Commerce two options on remand: either "not applying the CVD law to China,
or not applying the NME AD methodology." 9 Unless Congress passes
legislation that specifically allows for Commerce's application of parallel
200
duties (despite risks of double counting), Commerce should employ an MOE
analysis in its dumping and subsidy investigations 20to ensure fairness and equity
to both Chinese exporters and domestic producers. 1
1. Legislation Authorizing ConcurrentDuties Against NMEs

With an express grant from Congress, Commerce may continue applying
simultaneous duties against NME countries.202 In fact, Congress has already
proposed such legislation through the Trade Enforcement Act203 and the
Nonmarket Economy Trade Remedy Act.204
Many spectators believe, as a result of the GPX II ruling, that Congress will
hurriedly pass legislation to authorize Commerce's actions toward China. 205
This notion finds support in President Barack Obama's recent trade agenda,
which announced Commerce's new initiative to strengthen U.S. trade laws206
198. See GPX I, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1249 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009); Georgetown Steel
Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4-11.
199. Remand Results, supra note 161, at 41; see Ansel, supra note 8, at 921.
200. See discussion infra Part III.B.L
201. See Ansel, supranote 8, at 923.

202. See 25 C.J.S. Customs Duties § 28 (West 2002). The judiciary's statutory interpretation
is restricted by the legislative intent. Id. If Congress has expressly approved of Commerce's
actions, then the court must adhere to the legislative grant of authority. Id. ("If the language of
the statute is clear, then the Court of International Trade must defer to Congressional intent."
(citation omitted)).
203. See Trade Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R. 496, 111th Cong, § 201 (2009), availableat
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 11-496 ("To amend United States trade laws to
eliminate foreign barriers to exports of United States goods and services, to restore rights under
trade remedy laws, to strengthen enforcement of United States intellectual property rights and
health and safety laws at United States borders, and for other purposes.").
204. Nonmarket Economy Trade Remedy Act of 2009, H.R. 499, 111th Cong. § 2(f) (2009),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h 111-499 ("To amend title VII of the
Tariff Act of 1930 to provide that the provisions relating to countervailing duties apply to
nonmarket economy countries and for other purposes.").
205. David Spooner, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce for the Import Administration,
stated, "The issue generally is huge, but I wouldn't make too much of an issue about [the outcome
of GPX II] .. . I am confident Congress [will] step in, in a week and make it clear Commerce has
the ability [to impose concurrent trade remedies against China]." Drajem, supra note 106.
206. See Dep't of Commerce Press Release, supra note 5 (announcing a new trade policy to
improve the competitiveness of domestic industries).
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to further the President's National Export Initiative.207 This new initiative lists
fourteen measures that will enhance the effectiveness of U.S. ADs and
CVDs.208 In light of the Obama administration's support in enhancing trade
law to protect the domestic industry, Congress may follow this trend and
authorize Commerce's application of concurrent duties against NME
countries. 209
2. The Appeal Process: The Risks and the Benefits

Both petitioners and Commerce retain the right to appeal the GPX II
If neither party
decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.2
appeals the CIT's decision, then "the court's final opinion will become
conclusive," and the government will forego its collection of CVD duties from
the parties to the case.211 However, because Commerce's actions upon remand
were made "under protest," 2 12 commentators foresee that an appeal is "almost
certain."213 But, an appeal will involve some risks.
Currently, GPXII is not binding precedent because the ruling pertains only
to the parties in the case. 214 If the Federal Circuit affirms the CIT's ruling,
then Commerce would be prohibited from applying concurrent duties against
NMEs without providing for improved methodologies to prevent double
punishment. 215 However, if the court overrules GPX II, then Commerce's
216
practice would be upheld and it could continue its current practice.
Until the court deems Commerce's practices legal, exporters from NME
countries will continue to challenge the legality of the U.S. trade-remedy
regime.217 Parties similarly situated to GPX will bring their cases to the CIT,
218
using GPXH as support to plead their case.

207. Exec. Order No. 13,534, 75 Fed. Reg. 12,433, 12,434 (Mar. 11, 2010) (establishing the
initiative with the mission to improve the private sector's exportation abilities).
208. See Dep't of Commerce Press Release, supra note 5.
209. See Layton et al., supra note 91.
210.

Id.; see supra note 51.

211. GPX III, No. 08-00285, 2010 WL 3835022, at * I (Ct. Int'l Trade, Oct. 1, 2010).
212. Remand Results, supra note 161, at 2.
213. See GPX III, 2010 WL 3835022, at *1 ("[T]he government has made it clear that it will
appeal the court's decision . . . ."); Marsh, supra note 170, at 1.
214. Burke, supra note 181.
215. Id. (noting that the court's affirmation would create a binding precedent for all parties).
216. Id.
217. Layton et al., supra note 91.
218. Id.
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3. GrantingChina Market-Economy Status: Escaping the Scrutiny of
Inconsistent NME Duty Methodologies

Commerce has the administrative authority to determine whether to grant a
foreign country market-economy status.
Given China's substantial
economic reforms,220 many scholars believe that Commerce should recognize
China as a market economy.221 Nevertheless, Commerce has repeatedly
established that China does not warrant designation as a market economy. 222
In its Remand Results, Commerce reiterated that China has failed to
demonstrate characteristics meriting market-economy status.223 It would be
improper to designate China as a market economy because China continues to
exhibit great control over its market, mainly through resource allocation and
ownership over the means of production. 224 Commerce has repeatedly
declined to grant MOI status to certain Chinese industries because, from
Commerce's viewpoint, they fail to satisfy the three-prong test.225 Thus, it
remains highly unlikely
that Commerce would grant market-economy status to
226
the entire nation.

219.

See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18) (2006).

220. See Kimberly A. Tracey, Non-Market Economy Methodology Under U.S. Anti-Dumping
Laws: A Protectionist Shield from Chinese Competition, 15 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 81,

98-102 (2006) (discussing China's flourishing private sector, rapid privatization of assets,
operation within market environments, etc.); see also supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
221. Tracey, supra note 220, at 81. Chinese officials have lobbied for market-economy
status claiming, "[i]f 498 out of 500 Fortune 500 companies do business with China, it's because
we're a market economy." John W. Miller, Politics & Economics: EU May Lift Trade Rank of

Chinafor Concessions, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2007, at A7 (quoting Chinese Commerce Minister
Bo Xilai).
222. See Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 23, at 2-4 (discussing Commerce's
reaffirmation of China's NME status); Tracey, supra note 220, at 87. But see U.S. GOv'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-474, U.S.-CHINA TRADE: COMMERCE FACES PRACTICAL
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES INAPPLYING COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 13 (2005) (noting that other

countries, such as Malaysia and Singapore, have deemed China a market economy); Miller, supra
note 221, at A7 (reporting how just over one-third of WTO members grant China full
market-economy status.).
223. Remand Results, supra note 161, at 9.
224. See GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009) (outlining some prevalent
government constraints in China "such as the slow process of liberalizing the [Chinese currency]
to allow development of a normal foreign exchange market, the continuing restrictions on foreign
investment, the slow pace of reforms in the banking sector, and the limitations on private
ownership"); Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 23, at 2-4; Tracey, supra note 220, at
90 ("[The Chinese] government continues to nurture state firms to create larger enterprises with
greater advantages over privatized establishments." (citation omitted)).
225. Tracey, supra note 220, at 88 (noting the difficulty of separating an entire industry from
governmental control in a state-controlled economy).
226. McDaniel, supra note 14, at 765-66 (explaining how the lack of transparency and
reduced duties on imports make Commerce less inclined to grant market-economy status to the
entire nation or certain Chinese industries).
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Market-economy status may be proper when "the Chinese central
government will allow the free market to reign stronger in China." 227
However, granting China market-economy status prematurely could impose
significant hardships on the global economy. 228 Congress has afforded
Commerce the discretion to make this determination, and courts should defer
to the agency's administrative decisions. 229
4. The MOE Approach: The Superior Solution

Some scholars' observations indicate that "China's economy has changed
over the last twenty years. It is neither a free market, nor completely run by
the central government. It is arguably an economy like the world has never
seen before, and it is not surprising that the old rules no longer apply."230 Even
Commerce has recognized that "[tihe features and characteristics of China's
present-day economy . . . suggest that modification of some aspects of

[Commerce's] current NME antidumping policy and practice may be
warranted, such as the conditions under which [Commerce] might grant an
NME respondent market[-]economy treatment."231
Commerce should respond to the different evolving markets and treat certain
respondents as MOEs. 2 If Commerce utilizes this approach, then it can
effectively protect U.S. domestic industries from harm and still ensure that the
U.S. import duties reflect the conditions of the specific market of origin.233
This method will limit, to the extent possible, double counting duties because
domestic values will determine the dumping margin, allowing Commerce to
levy parallel duties while avoiding double punishment.234

227.
228.

McBride, supra note 7, at 294.
Cf id. ("Internal Chinese prices can also be heavily influenced by the central

government to the extent that it is incorrect to call China a market economy.").
229. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B)(vi) (2006) (giving Commerce discretion to evaluate "other
[applicable] factors" in considering the propriety of granting a country market-economy status);
see also supra note 72.

230. McBride, supra note 7, at 294.
231. Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 23, at 11.
232. In 1992, Commerce outlined the concept of granting market-oriented status to certain
Preliminary
Chinese industries, while the country remained designated as an NME.
Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value: Sulfanilic Acid from the People's Republic of
China, 57 Fed. Reg. 9409 (Mar. 18, 1992).
233. MOE treatment provides the superior solution because the United States can levy duties
based on different rates and tariffs, accurately reflecting the conditions of the foreign
marketplace.
234. See supra note 10. If a specific industry is categorized as market-oriented, then
Commerce will use its standard methodology in applying trade remedies. This standard method,
used for market-economy countries, eliminates the risk of double counting because the values are
consistent and based on prices in the home market. Id
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Dumping margins increase substantially when calculated according to
surrogate-country information.235 Studies demonstrate that the "average AD
duty rates imposed on Chinese (NME) exporters ... [are] significantly higher
than those imposed on market[-]economy exporters of the same products." 236
The MOE method exemplifies the fairest option by lawfully and accurately
capturing China's current market conditions.238 The majority of Chinese
businesses have significantly reformed to meet the standards of market
economies.239 It would be prejudicial and harmful for the United States to
deprive certain complainant corporations of market-economy treatment under
240
It is worth noting that in GPX II, the
circumstances where it is warranted.
241
CIT hinted that the MOE test provided the best compromise.
In this way,
the MOE methodology is the superior option because it would allow some
companies to benefit from market-oriented treatment, without prematurely
granting the entire country market-economy status.242
IV. CONCLUSION

In an age of liberal trade policy, unprecedented globalization, and a
worldwide economic deficit, flaws within the global trading system become

235. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 147, at 19 (2006); Quinglan
Long, Conflicting Positionsbut Common Interests: An Analysis ofthe United States Antidumping
Policy Toward China, 7 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 133, 135-38 (2008) (displaying China's
criticism of the surrogate-country methodology as unfair and inaccurate because it fails to
"provide a greater market orientation for China's economic transition.").
236. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 147, at 19 (finding that the AD rates
were twenty percentage points higher for Chinese companies than market economies); see Ansel,
supra note 8, at 895 ("[U]sing surrogate[-]country values of production leads to higher normal
value calculations, and thus higher penalties, than comparable anti-dumping actions against
[market economy] exporters."); cf Tracey, supra note 220, at 91 (criticizing India as a surrogate
country because its prices fail to "fully capture China's competitiveness").
237. Ansel, supra note 8, at 933 (asserting that an MOE approach provides a "predictable,
consistent, and accurate valuation" of duties against imports from NMEs).
238. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 147, at 20 ("[I]ndividually
determined duty rates assigned to Chinese companies ... were not substantially different . .. from
the individually determined rates assigned to market economy companies."); see also BENTLEY &
SILBERSTON, supra note 13, at 37-38 (explaining that valuations in China are different because
"it has very low wage costs, an enormous workforce, high levels of skill in many industries, and
large inward investment, bringing with it technological progress and increased productivity").
239. See e.g., Georgetown Steel Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4-11 (indicating that the
United States has recognized that the Chinese economy has transitioned enough to be accorded
CVDs).
240. See Tracey, supra note 220, at 93 (warning that not granting China market-economy
status would inhibit global trade and harm domestic firms as well as consumers).
241. GPXII, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1347 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010); see supra note 180.
242. See McDaniel, supra note 14, at 766 (emphasizing that granting individual enterprises
market-economy status will also help acclimate the global economy to the WTO-mandated
market classification of China by 2016).
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magnified. The law must constantly evolve and develop to meet the demands
of the ever-changing global market.
GPXII illustrates the current problems facing U.S. countervailing policy as
applied against China, 243 but this case does not represent the only issue within
U.S.-China relations. First, China's deliberate undervaluation of its national
currency threatens U.S. domestic industries as well as the prosperity of the
global market.244 Second, China's use of certain "WTO-inconsistent" practices
and policies gives it an unfair trade advantage, while harming U.S. businesses
and jobs.245 The importance of these issues has become critical, especially
given the approaching 2016 deadline by which all WTO members must grant
China market-economy status.246
The GPX II case is just one example of the various issues that threaten
U.S.-China relations. The recent decision from the WTO Appellate Body,
finding the U.S. practice of "double remedies" inconsistent with the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, substantiates the
ruling will
validity of GPX's argument.247 Trade analysts speculate that this
248
This ruling
greatly impede Commerce's ability to levy CVDs against China.
indicates the global disagreement with the current practice of the United States
and may be a catalyst for trade reform in Washington, D.C. The executive,
legislative, and judicial branches are now charged with developing a system
that can effectively handle the pending U.S. trade-related problems. The MOE

243. See supra Part II.F.
244. Schneider, supra note 193, at A18 (expressing concern that other countries will follow
China's example by manipulating their currencies, putting stress on the global economy). China
plays a crucial role in the viability of the global economy,
[b]y continuing to implement reforms to strengthen domestic demand and by
allowing the exchange rate to move higher to reflect fundamental economic forces,
China will make a significant positive contribution to the global rebalancing effort, help
reduce pressure on those emerging market economies that have more flexible exchange
rates, and provide a more level playing field for trading partners around the world.
Treasury Dep't Statement, supra note 193.
245. See Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Launches Section 301 Investigation
into China's Policies Affecting Trade and Investment in Green Technologies (Oct. 15 2010),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/node/6227. A recent investigation launched under Section 301
of the 1974 Trade Act, in which the petitioners argue that China's use of illegal export restraints,
prohibited -subsidies, and discriminatory trade practices unduly harm U.S. interests in the wind
and solar-energy sector, illustrates the tension of China's unfair trade advantage. Id
246. Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, art. 15(d), WT/L/432
(Nov. 23, 2001).
247. Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 611(d), WT/DS379/ABIR (Mar. 11,
2011) (overruling Report of the Panel, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010)).
248. Inside Washington Publishers, U.S. Hints WTO Decision Could Hamper Ability to Apply
CVDs to China, INSIDE US-CHINA TRADE, Mar. 30, 2011, at 5-6.

840

Catholic UniversityLaw Review

[Vol. 60:809

approach provides a superior solution-fairly regulating free-trade practices,
while safeguarding domestic prosperity. 2 49

249. See supra Part III.B.4.

